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The inequitable conduct doctrine empowers a court to refuse to enforce
a patent upon a clear showing that a patentee intended to deceive the
Patent and Trademark Office. Some form of the doctrine has existed in
the United States since 1790. Despite its longstanding existence,
however, the doctrine is unpopular at present with patent prosecutors,
legislators, and judges alike. Borrowing from experience and case law
arising under the federal securities laws, recent opinions of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit aim to make inequitable
conduct harder to plead and harder to prove. This Article argues that
the disclosure policies the inequitable conduct doctrine advances are ill
served by standards that result in treating dissimilar patentees alike.
Rather than concerning itself with the morality of participants in the
application process, the inequitable conduct doctrine should aim to
ensure examiners get the information they need to make the system
work. A more pragmatic, disclosure-oriented approach would be more
predictable and useful than the court's current approach.
[W]e are faced with questions of both socioeconomic policy
on the one hand, and morals or ethics on the other. We . . .
should not so emphasize either category as to forget the
other.
-Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co.'
The definition of a legal subject is thus a legitimate, and
quite conceivably a practically important matter. But it is a
matter of analysis of facts, not of search for an inhering
essence.
-John Dewey2
* Lyle L. Jones Professor of Competition and Innovation Law, University of San Diego
School of Law.
1. 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
2. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655,661 (1926).
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INTRODUCTION
The inequitable conduct doctrine empowers a court to refuse to
enforce a patent upon a clear showing that a patentee intended to
deceive the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) through the
concealment of material information or through the submission of
materially false information.3 Antecedents of the doctrine may be
traced to the Patent Act of 1790 and to English practice before that.4
The constant presence of some form of the doctrine suggests some
form of it is helpful to the sensible operation of the patent system.
The doctrine is unpopular at present, though. Lawyers who
prosecute patents, and whose conduct the doctrine scrutinizes, dislike
it. They also seem to think infringement defendants assert the
defense reflexively, so that prosecutors can never immunize
themselves from claims of inequitable conduct, no matter how
scrupulous their conduct may be. Many legislators and judges appear
to believe the doctrine is asserted too often and view the frequency of
its assertion as a sign of a flaw in its structure.' The Federal Circuit's
recent opinions cast the doctrine as a noxious weed and some judges
seem to see themselves as particularly vigorous gardeners.6
Borrowing from experience and caselaw arising under the federal
securities laws, these opinions aim to make inequitable conduct
harder to plead and harder to prove. The Federal Circuit recently
decided to rehear en banc a case upholding a finding of inequitable
conduct, likely for the purpose of further limiting the scope of the
defense.'
Even before the court's most recent rehearing grant, the
unpopularity of the inequitable conduct doctrine led the Federal
Circuit to weaken it over time. Under current law, an infringement
defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that a
3. Benjamin Brown, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 594-95 (2009).
4. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 37,39-40 (1993).
5. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 737-38 (2009).
6. A different metaphor, suggested by Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d
1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988), would cast the doctrine as a plague and the Federal Circuit as a
physician with the right antibiotic.
7. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010), review
granted 2010 WL 1655391.
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patentee deliberately intended to deceive the PTO through material
misstatements or omissions. As a result, courts treat a patent issued
after the patentee complied scrupulously with all relevant obligations
no differently than a patent issued after the patentee more likely than
not attempted to deceive an examiner by withholding material
information the examiner did not otherwise have, and no differently
from a patent obtained by a patentee who clear and convincing
evidence shows to have misled the PTO through reckless disregard
for the truth.'
This Article argues that the disclosure policies the inequitable
conduct doctrine advances are ill served by standards that result in
treating such dissimilar patentees alike. To the extent the inequitable
conduct doctrine has problems, they stem not from the doctrine's
pleading or scienter requirements but from the relatively blunt
remedy the Supreme Court has prescribed and, even more
fundamentally, from a cost asymmetry that may be remedied through
simple orders shifting fees and costs in cases where the defense is
asserted without foundation. The Federal Circuit's hostility toward
the doctrine is not justified and is manifesting itself in rulings that are
likely to be counterproductive.
I
Antecedents of the inequitable conduct doctrine may be traced
to the beginning of the U.S. patent system and beyond. The doctrine
was weakened during the roughly one hundred years after
reorganization of the PTO in 1836 but was revived in the wave of
judicial economic populism and corresponding anti-patent sentiment
in the 1930s and 1940s.9 The cases occasioning the revival had
unusual facts, which provided a poor basis for the doctrine they
created. Nevertheless, the provenance of the doctrine suggests what
analysis confirms: the doctrine is important to a well-functioning
patent system.'0
8. See Brown, supra note 3, at 603-05; see also Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d
963, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
9. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 45-51.
10. The following is a truncated prdcis of the doctrine's history. My main topic here is the
optimal structure under present conditions and what I see as unwise attempts to rein in the
doctrine by loading it up with unrealistic procedural requirements and adopting an unrealistic
epistemology. For a fuller discussion, see Goldman, supra note 4.
Spring 2010] 947
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.43:945
A
Section 5 of the first Patent Act, adopted in 1790, provided a
right of action to cancel a patent." Within one year of issuance a
challenger could submit in the district court where the defendant
lived an oath showing the patent had been "obtained surreptitiously,
or upon false suggestion."l2 If the court deemed the showing
sufficient, it was empowered to issue an order to the patentee to
show cause why the patent should not be repealed. 3 If the patentee
failed to show cause in such a case, the court was to render a
judgment repealing the patent. 4 If the patentee did show cause,
however, the "party at whose complaint the process issued, shall
have judgment given against him, [and] he shall pay all such costs as
the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit.""
This right of action for cancellation carried into American patent
practice the writ of scire facias, the English procedure requiring the
beneficiary of a judicial record to appear and show cause why it
should not be repealed and the cause resolved against him. 6 In
England, the writ provided the means by which the Queen, in her
prerogative, could repeal her grant of a patent where she had been
"deceived by a false suggestion."" The "false suggestion" language
is ambiguous with respect to the patentee's state of mind. The most
natural reading of the term is that any falsity justified repeal (after
all, a regent misled innocently is still a regent misled) but one could
read "false suggestion" together to extend the writ only to deliberate
lies.
Section 6 of the 1790 Act provided that one accused of
infringement could defend on the ground that "the specification filed
11. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793) (current version at 35





16. See THOMAS CAMPBELL FOSTER, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF SCIRE FACIAS 12
(London, V. & R. Stevens and G.S. Norton 1846).
17. Id. The practice was quite old. Sir Edward Coke recognized that the writ would lie when
"the King granteth any thing that is grantable upon a fal[s]e [s]ugge[s]tion," and Coke opined that
the "highest point of [the chancellor's] jurisdiction" was "to cancel the king's letters patents
under the great [s]eal, and dam[n]ing the [e]nrolment thereof, by drawing [s]trikes through it like
a lettice." EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
87-88 (London, John Streeter et al. 1671).
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by the plaintiff did not contain the whole truth concerning his
invention or discovery.""8 Under this provision,
[I]f the concealment of part, or the addition of more than is
necessary, shall appear to have been intended to mislead, or
shall actually mislead the public, so as the effect described
cannot be produced by the means specified, then, and in
such cases, the verdict and judgment shall be for the
defendant."
Two things about this provision are worth noting. First, it seems
to aim at enablement-enforcing the "patent bargain" by making
sure one who read the patent could practice the invention. Second,
the provision applies both to patentees who intended to mislead the
public and to those who did so regardless of their intention.
The 1793 Patent Act ("1793 Act") included modified versions of
both provisions. Section 10 extended to three years the time to bring
an action for cancellation.2 0 Section 6 modified the defense in two
ways. The 1793 Act eliminated the defense for cases in which the
patentee "actually misled" the public without intending to do so and
it added language seeming to heighten the standard of proof for the
defense.2 1 The new language stated that the defense prevailed only if
the concealment or addition "shall fully appear to have been made"
"for the purpose of deceiving the public."2 2
Perhaps more importantly, the 1793 Act did away with any
pretense of examination and instead required applicants to submit
affidavits averring to the statutory elements.2 3 That did not work.
Fraud and conflicting claims were common.2 4 Things changed with
the general reorganization of the patent office under the 1836 Patent
Act.
Section 15 of the 1836 Patent Act ("1836 Act") carried forward
the substance of the defense provided by the 1793 Act.25 The 1836
18. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. at 111.
19. Id. § 6, at 11-12.
20. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 10, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).
21. Id. §6, at 322.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 3, at 321.
24. Goldman, supra note 4, at 40-41.
25. See also Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Russell, 37 F. 676, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) (requiring intent
to deceive to establish statutory defense).
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Act did not provide a cause of action for cancellation, however, and
it limited the defense against patents "surreptitiously or unjustly
obtained" to cases where the patentee claimed the invention of
another who was exercising reasonable diligence in perfecting the
invention.26 Only in the case of interference did the 1836 Act provide
a private right that might lead to cancellation.2 7
Accordingly, in Rubber Co. v. Goodyear" and Mowry v.
Whitney,29 the Supreme Court declined to consider allegations of
fraud leveled by a private party seeking to challenge an existing
patent. Both cases noted the 1836 Act's elimination of the private
right of action for cancellation;30 Mowry conceived of the writ of
scire facias (and the equitable remedies that supplanted it in
American law) as asserting a right belonging to the defrauded
party-the government." In United States v. American Bell
Telephone Co. (American Bell 1),32 the Court converted the dicta in
Mowry into a holding that the government had standing to bring a
claim for repeal of a patent allegedly obtained by fraud even though
the 1836 Act contained no language authorizing such a suit.33
American Bell I also outlined the pleading standard necessary to
proceed with such a case.34 Bell demurred to the complaint on the
ground that the government had not alleged fraud with enough
specificity." The Court replied:
It is a mistake to suppose that in stating the facts which
constitute a fraud, where relief is sought in a bill in equity,
all the evidence which may be adduced to prove that fraud
must be recited in the bill. It is sufficient if the main facts or
26. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (repealed 1842) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).
27. Id. § 16, at 117, 123-24 (repealed 1842).
28. 76 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1869).
29. 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871).
30. Id. at434, 440-41; Rubber Co., 76 U.S. at 797.
31. Mowry, 81 U.S. at 440-41. Courts applying Mowry read it as barring ordinary
defendants from asserting inequitable conduct as a defense. See Vortex Mfg. Co. v. Ply-Rite
Contracting Co., 33 F.2d 302, 313 (D. Md. 1929).
32. 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
33. Id. at 373.
34. Id. at 356.
35. Id. at 351.
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incidents which constitute the fraud against which relief is
desired shall be fairly stated . . . .3
The allegations of the complaint were in fact fairly detailed, so
this comment might be taken less severely than it reads, but it sheds
some light on what the Court was willing to accept in government
suits.
In addition, the Court began its explanation of why the
government was allowed to bring such a suit without statutory
authorization by adopting a highly moral tone that emphasized the
badness of the patentee. The claim that the government had no power
to bring suit, the Court said, implied that
a party may practice an intentional fraud upon the officers
of the government who are authorized and whose duty it is
to decide upon his right to a patent, and that he may by
means of that fraud perpetrate a grievous wrong upon the
general public, upon the United States, and upon its
representatives."
It was this "gross fraud" the Court combated with its decision.3 8
American Bell I carries some hints of a general aversion to
patents. The Court said,
The United States, by issuing the patents which are here
sought to be annulled, has taken from the public rights of
immense value, and bestowed them upon the patentee. In
this respect the government and its officers are acting as the
agents of the people, and have, under the authority of law
vested in them, taken from the people this valuable
privilege, and conferred it as an exclusive right upon the
patentee.39
The late nineteenth century was not generally an anti-patent
period, however. For example, though the Sherman Act became law
only two years after American Bell I, initial decisions regarding the
intersection of patent and antitrust law favored patentees.40 The
36. Id. at 356.
37. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 370.
40. E.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 1 (1912); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'1 Harrow
Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94 (1902); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
F. 288, 301 (6th Cir. 1896).
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Court's preservation of the cancellation cause of action appears to
have been motivated more by abhorrence of fraud than of patents.4 1
This impression was confirmed when United States v. American
Bell Telephone returned to the Court in American Bell ."42 Having
allowed the cancellation action to go forward, the Court then had to
decide what proof would justify cancellation.43 The Court drew on
cases challenging grants of land patents (another historical use for
the scire facias writ) but found less need for cancellation in the
context of patents on technology." After all, the Court reasoned, an
erroneous grant of land took from the United States something it
previously owned, whereas an erroneous grant of rights to an
invention did not,4 5 and land grants were forever while technology
patents expired within a comparatively short time.46 The Court then
established a high burden of proof for such cases, which it borrowed
from the Maxwell Land-Grant case.47
The Maxwell case involved a challenge to a patent confirming a
Mexican grant of title in land the United States obtained under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war with Mexico.48
Congress confirmed the grant by statute. The government later
argued that the land patentee conspired to claim 265,000 acres more
than the original Mexican grant.49 (This land amounted to an entire
county in Colorado.)
41. Thus the Court's statement that preserving the cause of action allowed the government a
way to "correct this evil, to recall these patents, to get a remedy for this fraud .... " American
Bell 1, 128 U.S. at 370.
42. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (American Bell ll), 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
43. Id. at 238.
44. Id. at 240-42.
45. Id. at 239 ("The government parted with nothing by the patent. It lost no property. Its
possessions were not diminished.").
46. According to the Court, if clear and convincing proof is required in suits between
individuals,
it is much more so when the government attempts to set aside its solemn patent. And
we may here again repeat that if this is true when the suit is to set aside a patent for
land, which conveys for all time the title, a fortiori it must be true when the suit is one
to set aside a patent for an invention, which only grants a temporary right.
Id. at 251 (paraphrasing United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887))
(emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. at 365.
49. Id. at 358-59.
952
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There was some ambiguity in the language of the Mexican
grant. The land patentee asked the government to survey the grant
but the government initially declined. The patentee then
commissioned its own survey and delivered it to the government.
The government did not use that survey, however, and instead
ordered one of its own, on which the patent was finally based."o On
this record the government later claimed that the patentee's survey
overstated the grant's reach and that the patent therefore should be
repealed for fraud."
The Court disagreed. It held the patentee's survey withstood the
particular challenges the government asserted against it and, in any
event, the evidence for the survey was "as strong or stronger than
that for any other survey which could be made, or which has been
suggested by the counsel for the United States."52 This finding meant
that the Court was not certain that any misrepresentation had been
made in the first place. The Court also found there was "not the
slightest evidence" of intentional fraud, noting that the patent had not
been based on the private survey."
The Court refused to
set aside and declare null and void these surveys and
patents approved by the officers of the government whose
duty it was to consider them, and who evidently did
consider them with great attention, upon the mere
possibility or a bare probability that some other survey
would more accurately represent the terms of the grant.54
It was in this context that the Maxwell Court wrote the language
quoted in American Bell II:
50. According to the Court,
[i]f they attempted a fraudulent imposition, they were not successful; he rejected their
survey altogether, caused another one to be made, and pointed out in his instructions to
those who executed the final survey the points of departure from that made by Griffin,
upon which he insisted. It seems impossible, in the face of these circumstances, to
assume that there was anything in the nature of fraud perpetrated in regard to the
Griffin survey, and its effect upon the final survey.
Id. at 378-79.
51. Id. at 358-59.
52. Id. at 377.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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We take the general doctrine to be that when, in a court of
equity, it is proposed to set aside, to annul, or to correct a
written instrument for fraud or mistake in the execution of
the instrument itself, the testimony on which this is done
must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and that it
cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence
which leaves the issue in doubt. If the proposition, as thus
laid down in the cases cited, is sound in regard to the
ordinary contracts of private individuals, how much more
should it be observed where the attempt is to annul the
grants, the patents, and other solemn evidences of title
emanating from the government of the United States under
its official seal. In this class of cases the respect due to a
patent, the presumptions that all the preceding steps
required by the law had been observed before its issue, the
immense importance and necessity of the stability of titles
dependent upon these official instruments, demand that the
effort to set them aside, to annul them, or to correct
mistakes in them should only be successful when the
allegations on which this is attempted are clearly stated
and fully sustained by proof It is not to be admitted that the
titles by which so much property in this country and so
many rights are held, purporting to emanate from the
authoritative action of the officers of the government, and,
as in this case, under the seal and signature of the President
of the United States himself, shall be dependent upon the
hazard of successful resistance to the whims and caprices of
every person who chooses to attack them in a court of
justice; but it should be well understood that only that class
of evidence which commands respect, and that amount of it
which produces conviction, shall make such an attempt
successful."
One can understand the Court's concern with respect to land
titles. People sink costs into land and rely heavily on the stability of
titles. 6 But land is not the product of a process that presumes
55. Id. at 381-82 (emphases added).
56. The Court also invoked general equitable principles, drawing on cases voiding contracts,
among others. Id. at 379-81.
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applicants tell people the truth. The question in most cases is not
whether land shall be owned but who shall own it. Patents are
different, as the Court noted later in reviving the inequitable conduct
doctrine."
In any event, the Maxwell Court found no evidence of
corruption or deceit and, indeed, no evidence that there had been any
misrepresentation. The Court's discussion of the standard of proof
has the ring of dicta. Even if the Court's language is taken as an
unequivocal holding, however, the Court's reasoning does not extend
automatically to patents on technology rather than land. The court
was right to say that security of title is important: People must have
confidence in their title if they are to sink costs into improving their
land. With regard to real property this point favors current occupants
over other claimants. But the point has no similar valence with
regard to technology patents. Even defendants who do their own
research and development and copy nothing may be liable for patent
infringement. Such defendants have a legitimate interest in
exploiting their own investments, an interest that can be frustrated by
infringement suits.
Moreover, the Court in American Bell II adopted the Maxwell
language and applied it to the government's claim." That claim did
not amount to much: it centered on delay.59 The gist of the charge
was that Bell acquired an invention that improved on his basic
telephone, for which he previously had received his famous patent."o
Bell supposedly let the application on the improvement languish in
the patent office until his original patent was about to expire, thus
effectively extending the length of his rights.'
The government's claim did not even hint at misrepresentation,
and the Court rejected it summarily.62 The Court held that to prevail,
the government
57. See id. at 382.
58. American Bell H1, 167 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1897).
59. Id. at 240-42.
60. Id. at 243.
61. Id. at 244-46.
62. Id. at 248 ("The true rule is that if application has been made, and the applicant has once
called for action, he cannot be deprived of any benefits which flow from the ultimate action of the
tribunal, although that tribunal may unnecessarily, negligently, or even wantonly, if that
supposition were admissible, delay its judgment.").
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must affirmatively show that the delay has been caused in
some way by the conduct of the applicant, and before its
patent can be set aside, the government must, in accordance
with the rules laid down in respect to land patents, establish
that fact clearly. It may not rest on mere inferences, mere
suggestions but must prove the wrong in such a manner as
to satisfy the judgment before it can destroy that which its
own agents have created.63
B
American Bell I did not create an inequitable conduct defense in
the modern sense of the doctrine. A right of cancellation in the
government did ordinary infringement defendants little good.
Defendants could assert only the statutory defense for misleading
descriptions, provided they could show deliberate deceit regarding a
material aspect of the patent.64
In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,65 the Court
took a step toward creating the modern defense."6 The patentee in
that case had procured a false affidavit meant to suppress evidence of
prior invention and prior use that threatened the validity of the
patent.6 7 This trick worked to suppress evidence in one case but was
uncovered in a different case asserting the same patents." The trial
court denied a motion for injunctive relief, which cited the prior case,
63. Id. at 251.
64. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Co., 276 U.S. 358, 374 (1928) (holding no fraud
shown where patentee submitted declaration claiming to have used accelerant to vulcanize rubber
but had only shown that the accelerant worked without vulcanizing anything). The Court in
Corona Cord Tire stated:
Production of rubber goods for use or sale was not indispensable to the granting of the
patent. Hence the affidavits, though perhaps reckless, were not the basis for it or
essentially material to its issue. The reasonable presumption of validity furnished by
the grant of the patent, therefore, would not seem to be destroyed.
Id. See also Burke Elec. Co. v. Indep. Pneumatic Tool Co., 232 F. 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1916)
(affirming holding of Learned Hand, then a district judge, that defense would not lie where the
description, though misleading, was not intentionally so and the misleading element concerned
the operation of the invention rather than the elements of patentability).
65. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
66. Id. at 247. It is worth noting that even before Keystone Driller, some courts held that
misrepresentations to the PTO stripped an issued patent of its presumption of validity. See
Floridin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 35 F. Supp. 810, 814 (D. Del. 1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 669 (3d
Cir. 1942).




but required the defendants to post a bond."9 The district court also
rejected the defendants' claim that injunctive relief was barred by
unclean hands on the ground that, though the defendants had tried to
suppress evidence, no evidence had been suppressed in the case
before it.70
The court of appeals reversed, finding that the cases in which
evidence was suppressed were sufficiently connected to the case at
hand to justify application of the unclean hands doctrine.7 ' The court
held it did not matter whether the evidence suppressed was sufficient
to show anticipation. According to the court, "if the conduct was
reprehensible, it matters not that it was really unnecessary." 72 The
court reversed the district court's decision with instructions to
dismiss the equitable actions without prejudice. 73 The court did not
bar all suits on the patents. It left open the possibility of suits for
damages and, perhaps, even equitable relief in a new, untainted
action. The Supreme Court affirmed.74
Keystone Driller was an uncontroversial application of general
equitable principles. In Justice Black's influential opinion in Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,75 however, it appears in
conjunction with American Bell I to justify the modem inequitable
conduct doctrine.
In Hazel-Atlas, lawyers for Hartford, the patentee, wrote an
article praising its invention as revolutionary, paid a well-known
union president to sign it, and submitted it to the PTO in support of
its application.7 ' The patent issued and Hartford sued Hazel-Atlas for
infringement. Hartford lost at the trial court and, on appeal, relied
heavily on the article. The appellate court entered a judgment of
validity and infringement; its opinion quoted Hartford's article.
Hazel-Atlas then tracked down the union president to question him
69. Id. at 242.
70. Id. at 244. Even though the court denied the motion for injunctive relief, the defense
would have mooted the need for the bond.
71. Id. at 246-47.
72. Gen. Excavator Co. v. Keystone Driller Co., 62 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1932).
73. Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. at 244.
74. Id. at 247.
75. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
76. Id. at 240-41.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 241.
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about the article.7 9 He would not talk to Hazel-Atlas but did give
Hartford an affidavit and was paid $8,000 not too long thereafter.o
All this happened in 1932. In 1941 these facts came to light in
an antitrust investigation of Hartford.8 ' Hazel-Atlas then petitioned
the circuit court to vacate the appellate judgment on the ground that
it had been procured by fraud on that court.82 The circuit court denied
relief on the ground that the fraud was not newly discovered, the
article was not the primary basis of the opinion, and it had no power
to vacate its judgment in any event.83
The Supreme Court reversed.8 4 It did not care whether Hazel-
Atlas was diligent. Citing misuse cases, it held that "even if Hazel
did not exercise the highest degree of diligence Hartford's fraud
cannot be condoned for that reason alone. This matter does not
concern only private parties. There are issues of great moment to the
public in a patent suit."" Nor did it care whether the article was the
primary basis for the circuit court's opinion: "Hartford's officials and
lawyers thought the article material. They conceived it in an effort to
persuade a hostile Patent Office to grant their patent application, and
went to considerable trouble and expense to get it published."8 6
The Court then combined the holding of Keystone Driller with
the misuse doctrine that equity will not help a patentee extend the
scope or duration of a patent87 to hold that the district court would
have been justified in dismissing Hartford's claim had the fraud
come to light there.88 As noted above, the circuit court in Keystone
Driller dismissed the relevant claims without prejudice and held that
the misuse doctrine (though it does suspend all enforcement of a
misused patent) may be avoided if the patentee purges itself of
misuse. The Court nevertheless held that "[t]o grant full protection to
79. Id. at 242.
80. Id. at 242-43.
81. Id. at 243.
82. Id. at 240.
83. Id. at 243-44.
84. Id. at 251.
85. Id. at 246.
86. Id. at 247.
87. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
88. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250.
958
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the public against a patent obtained by fraud, that patent must be
vacated."89
The following year, in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co.
v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,90 the Court elaborated on
the doctrine. An employee of Automotive had invented a new
wrench while working for that firm but sought to commercialize it
with a third party, who filed a patent application." This application
included materially false statements regarding the invention and
other matters.92
The PTO declared an interference between this application and
another application assigned to Automotive.93 Automotive
discovered the fraud in connection with the interference
proceeding.94 It settled the interference by obtaining an assignment to
the third-party application (which claimed an invention as to which
Automotive probably had a prior assignment by virtue of its
employment agreement with the employee who invented it)."
Automotive obtained patents on both its application and the
third-party application it obtained in the settlement." It sued to
enforce them against a party that knew about the assignment.9 7 The
defendant asserted that Automotive's claims were barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands because Automotive asserted rights in a
patent it knew was obtained by fraud.98 The district court held a trial
on this claim and found that Automotive should be denied any
relief.99 The court of appeals took a different view of the facts and
reversed.'o
The Supreme Court "brought the case here because of the public
importance of the issues involved,"o' even though the disputes below
89. Id. at 251.
90. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
91. Id. at 808-09.
92. Id. at 809-10.
93. Id. at 809.
94. Id. at 809-10.
95. Id. at 813-14.
96. Id. at 814.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 807-08.
99. Id. at 808.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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were largely factual. The Court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals and reinstated the district court's judgment.'O2 In doing so, it
took the opportunity to elaborate on the doctrine in terms that
differed significantly from the rhetoric of American Bell II. Rather
than worrying less about technology patents than about land, the
Court held:
[a] patent by its very nature is affected with a public
interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special
privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting
the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.' At the same time,
a patent is an exception to the general rule against
monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open
market. The far-reaching social and economic
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable
conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope."'
The Court found Automotive acted "in disregard of the public
interest" by taking advantage of the fraudulent application rather
than doing "all within its power to reveal and expose the fraud."'04
C
Congress revised the Patent Act in 1952, replacing the old
statutory defense for misleading specifications with a new 35 U.S.C.
§ 282, which lists defenses generally. Section 282 provides that
unenforceability is a defense, which seemed to codify the inequitable
conduct doctrine without clarifying it very much.'
Cases following this revision and, more importantly, the
Supreme Court's revival of the doctrine, divided on some important
questions. Some courts took a more relaxed view of materiality than
the strict requirement established in Corona Cord. In Corning Glass
Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., o0 for example, the court cited
102. Id. at 820.
103. Id. at 816.
104. Id.
105. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
106. 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), modified on other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.
1967).
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Precision Instrument for the proposition that it could decline to
enforce the patent based on intentional but legally immaterial
misrepresentations."o' In Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp.'o the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that the defense should not be sustained unless
misrepresentations were material to patentability rather than to
another issue such as acceleration. Other courts were stricter." Some
courts stated that deception needed to be proved only to a
"reasonable degree of certainty,""o while others retained the "clear
and convincing" standard traceable to Maxwell."'
Perhaps most importantly from the perspective of the present
retrenchment of the doctrine, some courts maintained a strict
requirement that a defendant show intentional misrepresentation or
omission 12 while others held that reckless indifference to the truth
was enough.' The Ninth Circuit's Monolith Portland opinion
endorsed a gross negligence standard, and two years later, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals followed with its influential opinion
in Norton v. Curtiss.114
Norton rightly distinguished deceit as a defense from deceit as a
cause of action."' Norton might have gone farther and established an
107. Id. at 470. The court agreed, however, that the defense could only be established by
representations that met at least some standard of relevance. Id. at 471 n.27; see also SCM Corp.
v. Radio Corp. of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
108. 407 F.2d 288, 296 (9th Cir. 1969) (stating that "the use of willfully false testimony
cannot be fully rinsed away with a solution composed primarily of legal semantics").
109. See, e.g., Martin v. Ford Alexander Corp., 160 F. Supp. 670, 685 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(finding the defense was not established where there was neither evidence that incorrect affidavits
expedited prosecution or overcame objections, nor any evidence of scienter).
110. E.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 21
(E.D. Pa. 1958) (quoting Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 490, 510
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd, 233 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1956)).
111. E.g., Clark v. Ace Rubber Prods., 108 F. Supp. 200, 205 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
112. E.g., Martin, 160 F. Supp. at 685. The court required a finding of scienter, but its holding
was presumably overruled by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Monolith Portland, 407 F.2d at 296.
113. Monolith Portland, 407 F.2d at 297 (stating that "calculated recklessness about the
truth ... constitutes a serious breach of duty to the Patent Office"). Monolith Portland was a fees
case and the court held the patentee's conduct before the PTO justified an award of fees to the
defendant, although the court gave no indication that it intended to limit its holding to the fee
context. Id. at 293, 297-98.
114. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A 1970).
115. Id. at 793. In contract law, for example, as a rule "a party to a contract may avoid it even
if the other party obtained its assent by an innocent misrepresentation." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
WILLIAM F. YOUNG & CAROL SANGER, CONTRACTS 361 (6th ed. 2001); see Halpert v.
Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730 (R.I. 1970) (distinguishing misrepresentations in contract actions from
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ordinary "preponderance of evidence" standard for establishing the
defense. It could have pointed out that the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard traced to American Bell II and Maxwell, cases
asserting affirmative claims rather than defenses. The intervening
cases from Keystone Driller through Precision Instrument certainly
revived the non-statutory defense, and might reasonably be read as
reviving the traditional equitable standards for such defenses as well.
Norton did not do that, however. It endorsed the traditional standard
of proof without comment."'
The other circuits fell in line behind Norton,"' and there matters
stood until 1982, when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
took over the doctrine.118
II
In the past twenty-plus years the Federal Circuit has pared back
the doctrine it inherited. The court has kept constant the definition of
materiality but has narrowed the mental state sufficient to establish
the defense, set up a high standard for pleading the defense, and
applied a severe if not strained epistemology to inferences of
intention.
Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc.,"'
reversed Norton and held that a finding that an applicant had been
grossly negligent in its representations or in failing to disclose
information did not of itself establish the deceptive intent necessary
to show misconduct.120 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sonsl21  disavowed a strand of caselaw holding that
misrepresentations or omissions vitiated the presumption of validity
ordinarily afforded a patent.122 Combined, these holdings committed
those in tort actions). In the patent context, this rule may be defended on the ground that the cause
of action seeks judicial action while the defense seeks to avoid it. A court that strongly suspects it
is being asked to abet a patentee who was indifferent to the truth of his statements to the PTO
might well prefer to treat gross negligence as sufficient to establish the defense and thereby avoid
the notoriously difficult question of proving subjective intent. After all, once gross negligence is
established, such a rule essentially places the cost of uncertainty on the party who created it.
116. Norton, 433 F.2d at 797.
117. Goldman, supra note 4, at 64.
118. Id. at 67.
119. 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
120. Id. at 873-74.
121. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 1360.
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the court to treat patents procured by applicants whose gross
negligence deprived the PTO of material information no differently
than patents procured by applicants who complied scrupulously with
their obligations.
Notwithstanding these decisions, in 1988 the Federal Circuit
declared that inequitable conduct charges had become a plague. The
court described such charges in moral terms, suggesting that
accusations of inequitable conduct create a type of negative
externality that harms the profession and the members in it.'23 Later
cases emphasized that it is inequitable "to strike down an entire
patent where the patentee only committed minor missteps or acted
with minimal culpability or in good faith," and cautioned that courts
should "be vigilant in not permitting the defense to be applied too
lightly."' 24
Recent cases have adopted three techniques to rein in the
doctrine. First, they require that the defense be pleaded with the
particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).'25
Second, they emphasize the clear and convincing evidence standard
as a means of policing district court findings of fact. Third, they
stress the requirement that even material misstatements or omissions
are not inequitable if they were not specifically intended to
deceive.126
123. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The
court's reputational argument is worth quoting:
Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable
lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client's interests adequately,
perhaps. They get anywhere with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases,
but such charges are not inconsequential on that account. They destroy the respect for
one another's integrity, for being fellow members of an honorable profession, that used
to make the bar a valuable help to the courts in making a sound disposition of their
cases, and to sustain the good name of the bar itself A patent litigant should be made
to feel, therefore, that an unsupported charge of inequitable conduct in the Patent
Office is a negative contribution to the rightful administration ofjustice.
Id.
124. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
125. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2003). For criticism of this application see David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The
Application by District Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 895
(2003).
126. Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Star
Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365; Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that
inequitable conduct requires intent to deceive and not intent to withhold).
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The second and third techniques have created a remarkable
epistemology of inequitable conduct. Because findings regarding
intent are very sensitive to context, black-letter recitations of law
may be misleading. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that at present, a
specific intent to deceive cannot be inferred from the failure to
disclose material information even where the patentee is able to offer
no credible explanation for that failure, and even though an intent to
deceive may be the most probable explanation for that failure.'27
I argue here that the Federal Circuit has gone too far. In its effort
to limit the doctrine the court has exceeded whatever useful scope a
scienter requirement has (and, beyond recklessness, I see none) and
has far exceeded the admitted utility of a modest pleading
requirement. In doing so, it has made the doctrine more subjective
and less predictable except to the extent these steps will tend to make
it harder for defendants to prevail on the defense.
A. Scienter
The Federal Circuit's recent opinion in In re Bose Corp.128
illustrates the point. (Bose was a trademark case but its approach to
scienter may be generalized safely.) Bose applied to renew its
trademark on Wave and it opposed an application to register
Hexawave.129 Hexawave, Inc. counterclaimed for cancellation of
Bose's mark, claiming Bose committed fraud in its renewal
application. The basis of this claim was that in the renewal
application, Bose's general counsel averred that Bose was still using
the Wave mark in commerce on audio tape recorders and players. In
fact, however, as the general counsel knew when he signed the
affidavit, Bose had discontinued those products. On this ground the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) cancelled Bose's
registration.'
On appeal, Bose conceded that the affidavit was materially
misleading but argued it was not fraudulent because the general
counsel believed Bose satisfied the "use in commerce" requirement
when it repaired players it had already sold and shipped them back to
127. Larson, 559 F.3d at 1340-41.
128. 580 F.3d 1240, 1244-46 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
129. Id. at 1242.
130. Id. at 1243.
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customers.'"' The Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the TTAB's
order cancelling the registration.13 2
The Federal Circuit rejected the TTAB's use of a "knew or
should have known" standard for assessing scienter in a fraud
claim.' More importantly, though it did not dispute the TTAB's
findings that shipping repaired goods back to their owners is not "use
in commerce" for purposes of renewal, and though it recited the
general proposition that intent is hard to prove directly and therefore
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,'3 4 the court essentially
took the general counsel's self-serving statement at face value as a
sufficient basis to reverse:
There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned
by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a
willful intent to deceive. [The general counsel] testified
under oath that he believed the statement was true at the
time he signed the renewal application. Unless the
challenger can point to evidence to support an inference of
deceptive intent, it has failed to satisfy the clear and
convincing evidence standard required to establish a fraud
claim.'35
The court's language implies that there was no evidence of
deceptive intent, but that, I think, is wrong.'3 6 "Use in commerce" is a
term of art, usually indicating sales of branded products, even if only
token sales to establish rights for future more widespread sales.
When an author uses such a term in an idiosyncratic way, such as
claiming that "use in commerce" extends to shipment of repaired
goods, the reader is quite likely to be misled. As with passing off, the
likelihood of confusion from idiosyncratic use is itself evidence that
the author who misused the term intended to deceive the reader. It is
not conclusive evidence, as anything short of confession will not be
(and even a confession might be false), but it is evidence
nonetheless.
131. Id. at 1246.
132. Id. at 1246-47. The court did agree that the scope of the registration should be restricted
to "reflect commercial reality." Id.
133. Id. at 1244.
134. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
135. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246.
136. Indeed, the court found no evidence even of recklessness.
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This point might be made clearer with a symbolic example.
Suppose we treat "use in commerce" as a sign, S, that has an
accepted, dominant meaning, M. An author who uses S to express M
communicates honestly and in good faith because her words
correspond to the state of mind the modal reader or listener will
understand them to express. Now suppose "use in commerce" also
has a plausible literal meaning LM; what may we infer from an
author's use of S to express LM rather than M? That depends on how
far the literal meaning differs from the dominant meaning. The
inference rests on the assumption that the speaker knows the modal
meaning and thus knows the likelihood that a listener will be misled
by an idiosyncratic usage. The greater the distance between LM and
M, the more likely it is that a reader will be materially deceived by
the use of S and the more likely it is that a reader intended such
deception.
For purposes of illustration, suppose we conceive of this
distance as a probability (p) that a reader who sees S will understand
it to mean LM. This probability will, of course, be the flip side of the
probability of deception. Thus if p = 0, then the probability of
deceiving the reader will be 1, and vice versa. Assuming Bose's
general counsel knew the conventional meaning M, then his choice
to use the term "use in commerce" to express LM represents a choice
to increase the likelihood that the trademark office would be misled.
The closer p gets to 0, the more it seems that only one explanation
fits the facts: the general counsel intended to deceive the reader by
using a term of art in an idiosyncratic and materially misleading way.
It seems clear to me that in Bose, the use of the term "use in
commerce" to refer to shipment of repaired goods should count as
evidence of an intention to mislead. It is equally clear the Federal
Circuit did not see it that way. Why not? It is possible to read the
court as holding there was no dominant meaning of "use in
commerce" and therefore no baseline understanding against which
the probability of deception from Bose's use of the term could be
measured. However, I doubt the Federal Circuit believed a statutory
term has no dominant meaning.
Perhaps it is better to read the court as holding that even if there
were a dominant meaning of "use in commerce," any use of the term
that achieved at least some literal plausibility could not show the
necessary intention to deceive. This reading is supported by the
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court's comment in a footnote that "neither the PTO nor any court
had interpreted 'use in commerce' to exclude the repairing and
shipping repaired goods."m' On this view, a literal connection
between what the general counsel had in mind and the words he used
is enough to rebut any inference of deliberate deception unless an
authoritative body had held that the words did not extend to that
meaning.
On reflection, however, this view cannot be right either. For one
thing, it is easy to think of cases in which even the Federal Circuit
would reject a literally plausible claim. Suppose the general counsel
claimed that "use in commerce" included conversational use in social
"commerce" (i.e., Bose executives often toss the word Wave around
at cocktail parties). I have to think, and one certainly hopes, the court
would consider that story to be fraud. For another thing, why should
it matter if the PTO or a court had rejected whatever meaning the
general counsel claimed to have in mind? If the general counsel were
not aware of the decision then this fact would not be evidence of an
intention to deceive unless the court was willing to embrace a
recklessness standard or a "should have known" test, both of which it
rejected in Bose.
A third alternative is that the Federal Circuit wanted to preserve
space for lawyers to assert plausible but not intuitive meanings. This
happens all the time in litigation, where one might well expect to see
counsel advancing literal interpretations of statutes regardless of
accepted meanings. But the statement at issue was a statement of fact
about how Bose used the Wave mark, not a legal argument. The
trademark office relies on applicants to tell the truth, and it is
counterproductive to countenance, much less encourage, misleading
or even ambiguous factual statements, even if courts would give
more leeway to legal arguments.
Ultimately Bose shows that inferential reasoning about another
person's state of mind has two irreducibly subjective components.
One is the subjective intention of the person whose acts are in
question. The other equally subjective component is the inferences
and inferential processes a given observer such as a judge finds
plausible. Probably the best reading of Bose is that the court took the
opportunity to strike the recklessness standard and is unlikely to
137. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 n.2.
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extrapolate from the facts of the case guidance for future holdings. It
is not clear that this reading is right, however; the court should have
remanded for further proceedings under a different standard if that is
what it had in mind.
The Federal Circuit is likely to shed further light on this issue
when it rehears the Therasense case en banc, because that case
presents a similar, indeed clearer, example of the relationship among
common usage, terms of art, and intention. In Therasense the
patentee's counsel represented to the PTO that when used in a prior
art patent to describe whether a membrane had to be employed in
conjunction with a medical device the word "preferably" meant that
use of the membrane was actually required.13 8 The defendant alleged
this representation contradicted the patentee's representations to the
European patent office that the word was to be understood in its
ordinary sense, to mean optional.'39
Part of the parties' dispute, and of the dispute between the panel
majority and dissenting opinions, focused on the difference between
the "plain meaning" of words and meanings words might take on as
terms of art. The patentee's counsel testified at trial that "when
drafting and prosecuting applications, practitioners often use the
word "preferred" rather than 'required' in order to avoid a disclaimer
of claim scope."' 40 One could argue that this is an odd practice,
because if everyone knows "preferably" actual means "required"
then presumably 'preferably' disclaims whatever scope of invention
"required" would disclaim. Alternatively, some people might not
know of the convention so that using "preferably" could introduce
ambiguity regarding claim scope a patentee might seek to exploit in
later litigation. Choosing words to preserve ambiguity and thus a
138. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The
then-applicant also submitted an affidavit averring that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have so understood the language.
139. Id. at 1303.
140. Id. at 1322 (Linn, J., dissenting). Only part of the disagreement on appeal turned on the
meaning of "preferably." The parties, and the majority and dissent, also disagreed over whether
the patentee's statement to the European patent office that certain language was plain and
unambiguous did or did not extend to the word "preferably." Counsel testified at trial that as a
matter of normal English construction the patentee's submission did extend to that word but
counsel in fact did not intend to convey anything about the "preferably" language. Id. at 1304-07
(majority opinion). The panel majority found the trial court did not err in disbelieving this
testimony. Id. Judge Linn's dissent argued the testimony negated a finding that counsel intended
to deceive because counsel provided a plausible explanation other than deceit for not mentioning
the European submission to the PTO. Id. at 1322 (Linn, J., dissenting).
968
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
client's future strategy space does not prove an intent to deceive but
it does impair the efficient operation of the patent system by creating
the risk that the PTO will intend to grant a narrower scope of claims
than courts are forced to spend time considering in litigation. How
the Therasense court handles this issue therefore will provide a good
sense of how far the court now views inequitable conduct as a
practical tool as compared to a moral sanction.
B. Pleading
The Federal Circuit also has weakened the inequitable conduct
defense by requiring defendants asserting it to satisfy the pleading
standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires
that allegations of fraud be pleaded with particularity. The court of
customs and patent appeals had held that Rule 9(b) applied to a
trademark cancellation action based on fraud,14 1 and district courts
tended to apply the rule to the inequitable conduct defense. Professor
David Hricik objected to these rulings in a 2003 article arguing that
inequitable conduct does not, strictly speaking, require proof of
fraud, 14 2 but that same year the Federal Circuit endorsed the
application of Rule 9(b) anyway.'43 The court did not analyze
whether Rule 9(b) applied, but rather assumed its application was
obvious.'"
Of course some degree of specificity is needed to plead
inequitable conduct cogently. Where a defendant alleges an applicant
misled the PTO by failing to disclose prior art, the defendant should
have to allege what the undisclosed art was and why its alleged
concealment mattered.'4 5 As with the scienter requirement discussed
above, however, the Federal Circuit has recently used Rule 9(b) to
weaken the inequitable conduct defense in ways that threaten to be
counterproductive.
Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores is an important case in this
regard. The patents in that case claimed infrared thermometers for
141. King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
142. Hricik, supra note 125, at 913-20.
143. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350
F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
144. See id. at 1342.
145. Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d
1347, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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measuring body temperature. 146 The patentee won at trial but the
Federal Circuit found as a matter of law that one patent was
anticipated, another was not infringed, and that the defendant did not
induce infringement of a third. 147 The defendant had moved to amend
its answer to allege inequitable conduct as a defense. 148 The proposed
amendment claimed the (corporate) patentee failed to cite as prior art
two patents, which the amendment named. The proposed answer
contained a brief explanation of why the defendant believed each of
these two patents was material. The amendment did not name a
specific person who withheld the references, however, stating only
that the patentee and its agents or attorneys did so. The amendment
also alleged that certain statements the patentee submitted (in an
amendment to the application) to overcome rejections were false and
in fact were contradicted by material available on the patentee's
website. Again, however the amendment did not name the person
who made the allegedly false statement.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the
proposed amendment did not satisfy Rule 9(b), and the Federal
Circuit affirmed. 149 Although the court held that the Federal Circuit's
law governs application of Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct
pleadings, the court relied significantly on out-of-circuit securities
cases.' In particular, the court adopted Judge Easterbrook's
interpretation of Rule 9(b) in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young"' to hold that a
party asserting inequitable conduct must plead "the specific who,
what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or
omission committed before the PTO."'52
The court did not stop there. Rule 9(b) allows allegations of
intention to be pleaded generally, but the court related its "who,
146. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
147. Having disposed of the patents in suit on the merits, one might think the court would not
trouble itself with the defendant's cross-appeal, in which the defendant argued that the district
court erred in denying its motion for leave to amend its answer to allege inequitable conduct.
Perhaps the court answered the question because attorney's fees remained a live issue, but the
court gave no indication as to why its merits holdings did not moot its ruling on the pleading of
the defense. Another possible answer is that the court took the opportunity to limit the inequitable
conduct doctrine in what amounts to ten pages of dicta.
148. Exergen, 575 F.3d, at 1317.
149. Id. at 1316.
150. Id. at 1326-37, 1327 n.4.
151. 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
152. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327.
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what, when, where, and how" rule to the high level of scienter it
requires for the defense.'53 Thus, according to the court,
although "knowledge" and "intent" may be averred
generally, a pleading of inequitable conduct under Rule
9(b) must include sufficient allegations of underlying facts
from which a court may reasonably infer that a specific
individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or
of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2)
withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific
intent to deceive the PTO.'54
The combination of these two rules makes it hard to see how a
defendant could ever plead the inequitable conduct defense apart
from one of two situations: a confession by a patentee or a disclosure
by a "whistleblower," most commonly a former employee of the
patentee.
Exergen illustrates the point. The defendant alleged specific
prior art and a reason to believe that the patentee knew of it-the art
consisted of patents the patentee owned.' But the court found this
allegation failed at the outset because the defendant did not "name
the specific individual associated with the filing or prosecution of the
application issuing as the '685 patent, who both knew of the material
information and deliberately withheld or misrepresented it." 5 6
The court was clear that even if a defendant could name an
individual who both knew of a reference and was obliged to be
candid with the PTO, such allegations would not be enough: "A
reference may be many pages long, and its various teachings may be
relevant to different applications for different reasons. Thus, one
cannot assume that an individual, who generally knew that a
reference existed, also knew of the specific material information
contained in that reference."' 5 ' Therefore,
153. Id. at 1330.
154. Id. at 1328-29.
155. Id. at 1327.
156. Id. at 1329. The court also faulted the defendant for not alleging which claims in the
patent in suit the omitted references were relevant to and which aspects of those references were
the relevant ones. Id. This aspect of the court's reasoning is sound. Without such allegations,
there is no reason to care that a given reference was omitted.
157. Id. at 1330.
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[t]he mere fact that an applicant disclosed a reference
during prosecution of one application, but did not disclose it
during prosecution of a related application, is insufficient to
meet the threshold level of deceptive intent required to
support an allegation of inequitable conduct. Indeed,
SAAT's pleading does not contain specific factual
allegations to show that the individual who had previously
cited the '998 patent knew of the specific information that
is alleged to be material to the '685 patent and then decided
to deliberately withhold it from the relevant examiner.'
The court held such stringent prohibitions on inference were
necessary, "lest inequitable conduct devolve into 'a magic
incantation to be asserted against every patentee' and its 'allegation
established upon a mere showing that art or information having some
degree of materiality was not disclosed." 15 9
The court's "magic incantation" reference was sarcasm but it
was telling sarcasm. It depicts patent defendants as magicians or
sorcerers who think they have a telling trick to get them out of
trouble. The trick is in the words, the court implied, not the conduct
of the patentee. Thus, the court implies again, the words are recited
no matter how scrupulous or merely negligent the patentee might
have been. The end of the quoted passage makes clear that, to the
court, the merits are only loosely related to the materiality of a lie or
omission. The court was willing to tolerate a materially misleading
application (on the assumption that the omitted references were
material) but not a defense that is routinely, reflexively invoked.
Such data as there are do not justify the "magic incantation"
label. The defense is discussed in less than 20 percent of reported
cases between the years 2000 and 2007.160 Certainly this statistic
understates the frequency with which the defense is pleaded since
most cases are not reported, but it does not show that inequitable
conduct is a plague on patent lawyers or litigation. Of the cases in
which inequitable conduct was discussed, summary judgment was
granted for the patentee 19 percent of the time, implying that in most
158. Id. at 1331.
159. Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
160. Brown, supra note 3, at 608 (citing UNIV. OF HOUSTON LAW CTR., U.S. PATENT




cases, the court found the defense raised a triable issue of fact."'
More recent pleadings databases might provide more precise data, so
these numbers should be treated as provisional.162 But they do not
give cause for alarm associated with the defense.
The sarcasm evinced in the "magic incantation" phrase therefore
seems better explained by the Exergen court's moral view of the
defense. A footnote in the opinion states that one purpose of Rule
9(b) is to protect the reputations of persons accused of fraud by
making sure such accusations are either well grounded or not
made.' This view of the defense recalls the Burlington court's
argument that the inequitable conduct defense harms the profession
by coarsening it. Rather than adopt the view in Burlington that
lawyers should be shamed into not making inequitable conduct
allegations (the implication of the claim that lawyers should be made
to feel that allegations that fail create net losses to patent practice),
however, Exergen deals with the problem by making inequitable
conduct extremely difficult to plead.
The "magic incantation" language came from Judge (now
Justice) Alito's opinion in In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities
Litigation," and his rhetoric is in a tradition of judicial rhetoric
condemning "strike suits," which traces at least to Justice
Rehnquist's influential opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores.' The mild sarcasm of the language bespeaks the reality that
concepts such as scienter and rules such as Rule 9(b) are highly
malleable, no matter how clearly they might be stated, and how they
are molded depends very much on one's view of the contexts in
which they arise.
There is a degree of irony in Exergen's importation of securities
pleading cases into the inequitable conduct defense. In the securities
161. Id. at 611.
162. A recent study suggests inequitable conduct may be pleaded as a defense in 30 percent to
40 percent of cases while the Federal Circuit affirms a finding of misconduct in only about 1 in
250 cases. Christian E. Marnmen, Controlling the 'Plague': Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1329, 1357-61 (2009). As the discussion in the text
suggests, I disagree with the implied premise that Federal Circuit rulings can be considered a
reliable proxy for how often inequitable conduct may be said to occur if that doctrine is viewed as
a pragmatic tool.
163. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329 n.6.
164. 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997).
165. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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context, phrases such as "magic incantation" are used to justify strict
measures to thwart "strike suits," by which judges using such
rhetoric usually mean suits that are filed reflexively and with little
basis but which cost defendants a great deal of time and money to
defend. Depending on one's view and the art in question, of course,
that is exactly how many patent defendants see the infringement suits
brought against them, especially those filed by "non practicing
entities," which many defendants perceive as being lawyer-driven
shops in the business of filing suits rather than inventing things. Such
views roughly correspond with the way many securities defendants
see themselves as victims of plaintiffs' securities lawyers rather than
genuinely dissatisfied investors. Indeed, the moral position of the
patent defendant in many cases will be no worse than that of an
officer accused of securities fraud, because patent infringement is a
strict liability offense and requires no culpable conduct whatsoever.
Yet Exergen and the frame of mind its holding reflects make it
harder for firms to defend such cases, which is precisely the opposite
effect the same frame of mind has in securities law.
III
As noted above, the inequitable conduct doctrine expresses both
moral and instrumental concerns. In this part, I argue that the Federal
Circuit's recent opinions emphasize a one-sided view of the moral
aspect of the doctrine, specifically, the supposed wrong of the
reflexive "magic incantation" assertion of the doctrine. I do not
believe the remedy is to emphasize the other moral concern at
stake-that applicants tell the whole truth. Instead, it is to focus on
the instrumental concern that examiners have the information they
need to decide whether an application satisfies the statutory criteria.
Below I offer several recommendations designed to make the
doctrine more pragmatic and less moralistic. Though none of the
recommendations has much chance of being adopted (the court's
recent order granting rehearing in the Therasense case seems likely
to lead to further tightening of the doctrine), I recount them here to
make clear the difference between the doctrine we have and what I
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think a more pragmatic and less moralistic doctrine might look
like.166
At the most general level, the doctrine should focus on
examiners and judges and not on applicants. It should aim to ensure
that the PTO has the information it needs to do its job and that the
office's work is not undermined in later litigation by applicants who
try to take back concessions they made to get the patents they assert.
It should not aim to assess the moral worthiness of applicants or their
attorneys or to protect the reputation of the members of the patent
bar. Efforts to ground the doctrine in moral principles entail a choice
not to punish applicants who materially mislead examiners through
even reckless behavior. Exergen is explicit on this point.167
From a pragmatic point of view, it is very troubling to see
opinions that care more about an applicant's state of mind than about
whether an examiner was misled. Bose is essentially indefensible on
pragmatic grounds. Who cares what Bose's general counsel might
have been thinking when he used a phrase in a way likely to mislead
the PTO? The office would work better if applicants were forced to
use terms in their most accepted, relatively objective meaning rather
than idiosyncratic private, subjective meanings. Nothing would be
gained by having officials in the office grill applicants to see whether
they mean what they seem to have said.
Exergen fares a little better because part of the opinion pertains
to materiality. But suppose for the moment that the uncited art was
highly material and that someone within the applicant company
knew about the art and the pending application but decided to take
the chance that the PTO would not notice. Why should we care
whether the defendant knows that person's name prior to even
engaging in discovery? On these assumptions the examiner was
deprived of material information just the same, and the process
therefore provides correspondingly weaker support for the idea that
the patent should be presumed valid.
This general pragmatic orientation suggests several specific
doctrinal alterations. First, the court should reverse its course with
166. This approach is consistent with Professor Christopher Cotropia's call for greater
attention to the practical implications of the doctrine and less attention to its moral overtones.
Cotropia, supra note 5, at 747. I disagree with Professor Cotropia's call for a specific intent
standard, however, for the reasons stated in the text.
167. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1331.
Spring 2010] 975
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.43:945
respect to Rule 9(b). The premise that inequitable conduct is
routinely and reflexively pleaded undermines any claim that the
allegation actually tarnishes the reputation of patent counsel.
Members of the relevant community-other patent professionals-
presumably know the premise and discount the allegations
accordingly. The justification for applying the rule, that it is needed
to protect reputations from being sullied by unsubstantiated
accusations, does not extend to the inequitable conduct doctrine.
More fundamentally, pleading standards are a poor tool for
weeding out meritless claims. Pleading standards are about
specificity, not truth, and when they are used to preclude discovery
they are as likely to impede the search for truth as to advance it. In
most cases where the evidence is likely to be in the hands of one
party, very specific allegations require discovery. The application of
heightened pleading standards is also relatively subjective, no matter
how objectively the standards may be written. What passes muster in
one court might well fail in another. And it is always possible to
think of something more that could have been pleaded but was not.
Courts should focus on whether the evidence substantiates plausible
claims, not on how precisely the claims are described.
Perhaps the most cogent objection to relaxing pleading standards
is that doing so would increase litigation costs. Even if that were
true, it would not show that such relaxation creates net losses-
increased efficiency of the system might offset the cost. But
relaxation of the standards is unlikely to produce large cost increases.
Much of the evidence relevant to inequitable conduct is already
subject to discovery when invalidity is alleged. The prior art is sifted
either way,' as are facts relevant to invention or statutory bars.
Second, the court should reverse its course on scienter. Rather
than increasing the threshold to an ever more unrealistic level, the
court should return to a standard of recklessness. An applicant who
acts with reckless disregard for whether it has omitted or misstated
material information should be held responsible for not submitting or
correcting the information.
The standard also should treat entity assignees as one person.
Contrary to Exergen, it should not matter that one person in an entity
knows prior art has been withheld and another knows its full
168. See Hricik, supra note 125, at 940.
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significance. Nothing is gained by a rule encouraging tactical
compartmentalization of information that, if disclosed, would
improve the quality of review. This modification would require some
alteration of Rule 1.56, which presently requires each "individual"
associated with an application to disclose information material to the
application.169 Finally, courts should treat tactics to avoid acquiring
knowledge as equivalent to the avoidance of knowledge.' This is
the rule in the stricter environment of criminal law,"' and such a rule
in patent law would discourage compartmentalization.
Loosening the scienter requirement may be justified on doctrinal
and practical grounds. Doctrinally, the Norton court was correct to
say that a high level of scienter is not required when a party asserts
misrepresentation as a defense.'72 The rule may be justified on the
practical ground that a misrepresentation or omission undercuts our
faith in the utility of a bargain regardless whether the misstating or
omitting party intended to mislead anyone. More practically, states
of mind can only be proved inferentially from circumstance.
Limiting the doctrine to cases of confession, as Bose comes close to
doing, serves no purpose. The question should not turn on the soul of
an applicant or its counsel but on whether the PTO would work
better if persons in their position were required to disclose what they
know. It is a question of administrative efficiency, not abstract
morality.
Chris Cotropia has argued for strict scienter standards as a way
of reducing the problem of patent prosecutors dumping too much
information on examiners just to avoid being second-guessed for not
producing the information."' I address that argument in more detail
below. With respect to scienter, however, I disagree with Cotropia.
As noted above, if an applicant withholds a material reference the
examination process suffers regardless whether the applicant had an
169. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009).
170. Some cases, such as Braessler, US.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370,
1380 (Fed Cir. 2001), approach such a rule by affirming findings of inequitable conduct where
withheld information was plainly material and counsel who knew inquiry would lead them to
acquire the information chose not to inquire and therefore not to learn information the PTO would
want to know.
171. E.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming use of
"ostrich instruction" under which willful ignorance counts as knowledge).
172. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 797 (C.C.P.A 1971).
173. Cotropia, supra note 5, at 775-76.
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evil intention. In addition, because intention is always proved
inferentially, it is not clear that raising the verbal bar for the defense
will avoid information dumping unless additional steps are taken.
The most obvious additional step would be to forbid a court
from taking the materiality of withheld information into account
when assessing scienter. In Therasense the Federal Circuit has called
for briefing on whether it should continue allowing strong evidence
of materiality to influence judgments of scienter, so this step may
well be taken.'74 In my view, however, it makes no sense to divorce
the assessment of an applicant's state of mind from the significance
of a misstatement or omission. To do so would violate the common-
sense epistemology we use every day. Taken literally, the proposal
would require a court to determine whether an applicant intended to
withhold an unknown piece of information. Imagine asking a jury to
decide a securities fraud case without being told what the omitted
information was. Or, more prosaically, ask yourself if you could
advise a friend on whether his or her spouse or partner intended to
conceal information without knowing whether the information was a
twenty-year-old conviction for driving under the influence or a two-
month-old diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease. Whatever the
conceptual appeal of this approach, it contradicts common sense and
is therefore impractical.
Third, the standard of proof for inequitable conduct should be
preponderance of the evidence. The present high standard of proof
traces to Maxwell, which involved an affirmative cause of action for
cancellation of a grant rather than a defense.' The Maxwell court
was right to point to reliance and settled expectations as warranting a
higher level of proof in a cancellation action. In the technology
patent context, however, these concerns would seem to point the
other way or at least to be neutral. The default rule in our economy is
competition and freedom from misappropriation (copying). Patent
law deviates from both defaults and therefore may unsettle legitimate
expectations of defendants to profit from their own work. And no
patentee should have a recognized reliance interest in a patent
obtained through material misrepresentation or omission. The sword
174. Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson & Co., 2010 WL 1655391 (listing six questions
for rehearings; questions 1, 4 & 5 relate to the discussion in the text).
175. United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325 (1887).
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of the defense should be available to ensure examiners have the
information they need.
At a minimum, courts should alter the current doctrine to
deprive patentees of the statutory presumption of validity if the
patentee is shown to have materially misled the PTO, regardless of
the patentee's intention. Logically, that presumption should not
extend to patents procured through flawed processes because it is the
presumed integrity of the process that justifies the presumption."'
Courts have discarded this reasoning in light of the language of 35
U.S.C. § 282,'7 but absent compelling reason to believe Congress
intended the presumption to extend to demonstrably flawed
processes such holdings are unnecessary and unwise.
The best objection to these proposals is that the current doctrine
encourages patentees to give examiners too much information,
degrading patent quality by burying important references in a
mountain of material the prosecuting attorney dumps on the
examiner just to avoid being second-guessed later for not having
done so. Chris Cotropia articulates this concern in a very fine, recent
article."17
This "information overload" argument aims in the right direction
by pointing to the practical consequences of the doctrine. If and to
the extent the argument is right, my proposals are undesirable. I do
not think the argument provides a compelling objection to the
recommendations discussed above, however. It is plausible that the
incremental cost of dumping information on the PTO is very low. If
that is true, then virtually any sanction for failures to disclose
material information will produce dumping. And absent meaningful
sanctions, breach of disclosure obligations becomes a free good.
It is true, as Cotropia points out, that there is no reason to
believe the current penalties for inequitable conduct are optimal.
Allowing courts greater discretion to tailor remedies might well be
desirable, though beyond the scope of this discussion. There is little
reason to believe that any penalty will reach the optimal middle
ground in which neither too much information nor too little is
176. Cf KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 412 (2007) (discussing that the party
challenging a patent on the grounds that a claim was obvious must overcome the presumption that
an issued patent is valid).
177. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
178. Cotropia, supra note 5, at 775-77.
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produced, however. Even if deterrence is excessive in a given case, it
does not follow that it is systematically suboptimal. The optimal
penalty needs to take into account the probability of detecting
violations, which is presumably less than one. How much less we do
not know.
In the absence of such information, the "information overload"
argument does not, in my view, present a compelling challenge to the
reforms I recommend here. It would be better to deal with any such
problem by limiting challenges to those with a solid factual basis,
which is probably best done through more liberal use of fee awards
for meritless assertions of the defense. Ideally, and to the extent
possible, defendants who assert inequitable conduct claims without
foundation should be made to pay the costs they have caused others
to incur.
CONCLUSION
The inequitable conduct doctrine should aim at ensuring that
examiners get the information they need to make the system work.
The doctrine should not concern itself with the morality of
participants in the application process. Still less should it express
such concerns through pleading standards, which do a poor job of
sorting good from bad claims. The trend of cases is in the opposite
direction, but it is unlikely to bring certainty to the doctrine unless it
brings the certainty that comes from essentially eliminating the
defense. Both scienter and pleading standards are more subjective
than the court opinions suggest. Ultimately, the present trend in the
cases threatens to combat a perceived randomness in the doctrine by
introducing randomness of a different sort. A less moral and more
pragmatic, disclosure-oriented approach would be as predictable and
as useful as any approach is likely to be.
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